Introduction
Ring signature is a group-oriented signature with privacy protection [1] . A user can sign anonymously on behalf of a group on hisown choice,while group members can be totally unaware of being conscripted in the group. Any verifier can be convinced that a message has been signed by one of the members in this group,but the actual identity of the signer is hidden. ID-based ring signature combines the property of ring signature and ID-based signature. For the first time,zhang et al. constructed ID-based ring signature scheme from bilinear pairings [2] . Since then,several construction have been proposed [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Within the proposed ring signature schemes, some ring signature schemes are proven secure in the standard model. But these proposed ring signature schemes are all proven existential unforgeable,none of them is strongly unforgeable.
Existential unforgeability prohibits an adversary from forging a valid signature on a message which a signer has not signed. However, it does not prohibit an adversary from forging a new valid signature on a message which a signer has already signed. That is, the adversary, by giving a message/signature pair(M, σ) , may be able forge a new valid signature σ'≠σ on M. Strong unforgeability is a security notion which ensures not only existential unforgeability but also that no adversary can execute the type of forgery mentioned above [8] . For a variety of applications, strong unforgeability is needed. Strong unforgeability ensures the adversary cannot even produce a new signature for a previously signed message. The conversion from existential unforgeability signature to strong unforgeability signature was first studied by Boneh et al [9] . After that, strongly unforgeable signature was studied by many experts [10, 11] . These experts only studied the conversion of the ordinary signature schemes. We studied the conversion of a class signature with special properties, i.e., ring signature. Strongly unforgeable ring signature has a lot of applications. They are useful for building chosen-ciphertext secure signcryption systems. Strong unforgeability is needed to ensure that the adversary cannot somehow modify the signature in the challenge ciphertext and come up with an alternate valid signature on the same ciphertext. This alternate signature would give the adversary a valid ciphertext that is different from the challenge ciphertext. The adversary could then issue a decryption query for this new ciphertext and break the system. Consequently, a ring signature system that is existentially unforgeable but not strongly unforgeable would result into an insecure ring signcryption system. Without random oracle, all the existing ring signature schemes are not strongly unforgeable. They are only existential unforgeable.
Our contribution. In this paper,we construct a strongly unforgeable ring signature scheme (without random oracles) based on the standard discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and Au, et al.'s ring signature scheme which is only existential unforgeable in the standard model. Au, et al.'s ring signature scheme is not strongly unforgeable-given a ring signature on some message m it is easy to derive many other signatures on the same message m. Nevertheless,we use the Au, et al. 's ring signature scheme as our starting point. Through cryptanalysis, our proposed ID-based ring signature scheme is secure in the standard model.
Organization. We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section II, we give preliminaries and security definition. In Section III,we describe Au, et al.'s ring signature scheme and security analysis. In Section IV,we present the construction of our ID-based strongly unforgeable ring signature scheme in the standard model and the corresponding security proofs. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. Preliminaries And Security Requirement
Our scheme is based on the bilinear pairings and some difficult assumptions. They are given as the preliminaries. Then, we presented the security requirements of our strongly unforgeable ID-based ring signature scheme in the standard model.
Preliminaries
Let G 1 and G 2 be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear map with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity:For all u, vϵG 1 and a, b∈ Z p * , e u a , v b = e(u, v) ab ; 2. Non-degeneracy: e(g,g)≠ 1 3. Computability: It is efficient to compute e(u, v) for all u, v∈ G 1 . Definition 1(Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)). Given a group G of prime order p with generator g and element g a ∈ G where a is selected uniformly at random from Z p * , the DLP problem in G is to compute a. Definition 2(Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given a group G of prime order p with generator g and elements , ∈ where a, b are selected uniformly at random from Z p * , the CDH problem in G is to compute g ab . We select the group G 1 that satisfies that $DLP$ and CDH are difficult. Let H be a hash function : {0,1} * → {0,1} n . We say that algorithm A has advantage ε in breaking the collision-resistance of H if
(1) where the probability is over the random bits of A. Definition 3(Collision-Resistant Hashing). A hash family H is (t,ϵ)-collision-resistant if no t-time adversary has advantage at leastϵ in breaking the collision-resistance of H.
In practice, of course, one would use a standard hash function such as SHA-256 and assume that it is collision-resistant.
Aggregate Signature
Our proposed ID-based ring signature scheme in the standard model should be strongly unforgeable and anonymous.
Strong unforgeability. We specify a security model which mainly captures the following two attacks: 1. Adaptive chosen message attack 2. Adaptive chosen identity attack Adaptive chosen message attack allows an adversary to obtain message-signature pairs on demand during the forging attack. Adaptive chosen identity attack allows the adversary to forge a signature with respect to a group chosen by the adversary. To support adaptive chosen message attack, we provide the adversary the following oracle queries. Let = { 1 ⋯ } be a set of identities. An adversary A with Extract Oracle (EO) and Sign Oracle (SO) succeeds if it outputs ( , , ) ← , ( ) , such that it satisfies Verify(param, L, m, ) =valid, where L⊆ and |L| = n with restriction that (L, m, ) should not be in the set of oracle queries and replies between A and SO, and A is not allowed to make an Extraction query on any identity ID∈L.
The advantage of an adversary A is defined to be Ad vA = [ succeeds] (2) Definition 4(strong unforgeability). An adversary A is said to be an ( , , , )-forger of an ID-based ring signature scheme if A has advantage at least ε, runs in time at most t, and makes at most q e and q s extraction and signing oracles queries respectively. A scheme is said to be (ε, t, q e , q s )-strongly unforgeable if no (ε, t, q e , q s )-forger exists.
Anonymity. It should not be possible for an adversary to tell the identity of the actual signer with a probability larger than 1 , where n is the cardinality of the ring, even assuming that the adversary has unlimited computing resources.
Definition 5(Anonymity). An ID-based ring signature scheme is unconditional anonymous if for any group of n users with identity { 1 ⋯ }, any message m and signature σ, any adversary A, even with unbounded computational power, cannot identify the actual signer with probability better than random guessing. That is, A can only output the identity of the actual signer with probability no better than 1 .
III. Au Et Al.'S Id-Based Ring Signature Scheme And Security Analysis
Au et al.'s ID-based ring signature scheme [4] is the startingpoint of our proposed scheme. We convert their scheme into a stronglyunforgeable ring signature scheme in the standard model. First, wereview this scheme. Second, we analyze this scheme in stronglyunforgeable security model.
3.1Review of Au et al.'s ID-based ring signature scheme
Au et al.'s ID-based ring signature scheme in the standard modelconsists of four phases:Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify.
Setup:Let H u : {0,1} * → {0,1} n u , , H m : {0,1} * → {0,1} n m be two collision-resistant hash functionsfor some n u , n m ϵZ. Select a pairing e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 where the order of 1 , 2 is p. Let g begenerators of G 1 . Randomly select αϵR Z p,g2 , h ∈ R G 1 and compute g 1 = g α . Also select randomly the elements asfollows: u', v',U i , v j ϵG 1 , wherei=1, ⋯ n u , j=1, ⋯ n m . Let U={ui},V={vj}. The publicparameters are param=(e, G 1 , G 2 , g, g 1 ,  g 2 , h, u', v', U, V) and themaster secret key is 2 .
Extract. Let = ( )) for user j with identity ID j , where . Let I j [i] be the i-th bit ofI j . Define X j ⊆ {1, ⋯ } to be the set of indices such that I j i = 1, i ∈ X j . Randomly selects R uj ∈ Z p * and computesd j =
Sign. Let L = {ID 1 , ⋯ , ID n } be the list of n identities tobe included in the ring signature, including the one of the actualsigner. The secret key of the user 2) ). To sign a message ϵ{0,1} * , the signer I π does the procedures as follows.
( (2)Randomly select r 1 , ⋯ , r n , rϵR Z p * , compute U j = u′ u i for j = 1,2, ⋯ , n i∈X j and σ 1 = g r 1 ,
the signer ID π outputs the ring signatureσ = (σ 1 , ⋯ , σ n+2 ). Verify. Given a signature σ = (σ 1 , ⋯ , σ n+2 )fora list of identities L on a message M, a verifier verifies asfollows:
(1)Compute = , , = ′ = 1,2, ⋯ , ; ∈ (2)Check that whether the following equation holds:
Output valid if the equality holds. Otherwiseoutputinvalid.
Analysis of Au et al.'s ID-based ring signature scheme
From the review of the Au et al.'s ID-based ring signature scheme, weknow that it is existential unforgeable, but it is not stronglyunforgeable. This point is also noted in Au et al.'s paper. They didnot give the attack method in detail. We described it as follows. 
IV. The Proposed Strongly Unforgeable Ring Signature Scheme In The Standard Model
Strongly unforgeable ring signature in the standard model has a lotof applications. For example, it can be used in ring signcryption. Auet al.'s ID-based ring signature schemecan not be used in ringsigncryption design because it is not strongly unforgeable. To thebest of our knowledge, there does not exist strongly unforgeable ringsignature scheme in the standard model until now. Based on Au etal. 's ID-based ring signature scheme in standard model, we proposed astrongly unforgeable ring signature scheme in the standard model.
Our strongly unforgeable ID-based ring signature scheme in the standard model
Our scheme also consists of four phases:Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify. Sign. Let L = {ID 1 , ⋯ , ID n }be the list of n identities tobe included in the ring signature, including the one of the actualsigner. The secret key of the user 2) ). To sign a message M ∈ {0,1} * , the signer ID π does the procedures as follows.
(1)Select r 1 , ⋯ , r n , r, s ∈ R Z p * ,, computeU j = u′ u i for j = 1, ⋯ , n i∈X j 
At last, the signerID π outputs the ring signatureσ = σ 1 , ⋯ , σ n+2 , s . Verify. Given a ring signatureσ = σ 1 , ⋯ , σ n+2 , s for a list of identitiesL on a message M, a verifier verifies it as follows:
(1)Compute t = H(M) σ 1 ⋯ σ n+1 ; (2)Compute = ( , ); (3)Check that whether the following equation holds:
Output valid if the equality holds. Otherwise outputinvalid.
Security analysis
We will prove that ourproposed scheme is unconditional anonymous and strongly unforgeableunder a chosen message and identity attack in the standard model. Theorem 1(Anonymity):Our proposed ID-based ring signature scheme isunconditional anonymous. Proof:In the ID-based ring signature σ = σ 1 , ⋯ , σ n+1 , σ n+2 , s , σ i , i ∈ {1, ⋯ , n}/π and σ n+1 are randomly generatedwhich provide no information on the actualsigner. σ π = d π (2) g r π . r π is randomlygenerated by the actual signer. Thus, σ π is also randomlydistributed. In addition to {σ i }, i ∈ {1, ⋯ , n + 1}/π,
According to the Sign procedure, we know thatr 1 , ⋯ , r π−1 , r u π + r π , r π+1 , ⋯ , r n , r, s arerandom numbers while g 2 α is the master's secret key. All ofthem provide no information on the actual signer. Our proposed schemeis unconditional anonymous.
Theorem 2(Strong unforgeability): The proposed ID-based ringsignature scheme is strongly unforgeable in the standardmodel, assuming that Au et al.'s ID-based ring signature isexistential unforgeable in the standard model and DLP assumption inthe group G1 holds.
Proof:According to the Ref. [4] , Au et al.'s ID-based ring signaturescheme is known to be existential unforgeable based on CDHassumption. Suppose A is a forger that(t, q e , q s , e)-breaks strong unforgeability of the proposednew scheme which is denoted as , where q e , q s denote thetotal number of the Extract queries and Sign queries. Forger A asksfor signatures on message/ring pairs 1 , 1 , ⋯ , ( , )and is given signaturesσ = (σ 1,j , ⋯ , σ n+2,j , s j ), wherej=1,⋯, q on the message/ring pairs. Type 2 forger:SupposeA is a type 2 forger. We construct achallenger B that can break DLP on the group G1. B runs A asfollows. B is given a random pair (g', h') and its goal is to SetupBsets g ← g ′ , h ← h′, and generatesthe remaining elements of the public key the private key accordingto Setup procedure of our proposed ring signature scheme. B givesA the public key param=(e, G1, G2, g, g1, g2, h, u', v', U, V) andkeeps the master secret key g 2 α private. Extract is the same as the Extract procedure of our proposedring signature scheme. Signature Oracles. When A queries a ring signature on themessage/ring pair (M, L), B responds by runningSign( 2 , M, L) and returning the signature to A.
Verify:Because the Sign oracle is the same as the actualsignature phase, the received signature can pass the verification.
Output. . This is contrary to the DLPassumption. Thus, our proposed ID-based ring signature scheme in the standardmodel is strongly unforgeable.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a ID-based ring signature scheme which are strongly unforgeable in the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first one. Our scheme's strongly unforgeability is based on Au, et al.'s ring signature scheme security and DLP assumption.
